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FAMILY LAW SCHOLARSHIP GOES
TO COURT: FUNCTIONAL
PARENTHOOD AND THE CASE OF
DEBRA H. v. JANICE R.
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG,
HARRIET ANTCZAK
& MARK MUSICO

Family law literature, while diverse in its exploration of
contemporary families, also offers important threads of
consensus. These strong points of coherence, when brought
together with relevant case law, can be a useful means of
advancing the academic conversation as well as engaging
directly with courts to shape the law's development.
In a field as complex as family law, myriad academic
viewpoints on any given issue often make it difficult to imagine
scholarly discussion having utility for courts. As we aim to show
here, however, amicus briefs can be important vehicles for
synthesizing the literature, highlighting basic points of
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consensus and connecting family law scholarship to ongoing
cases.
The Family Law Academics Amicus Brief
The amicus brief reproduced here ("the Brief") makes the
connection between family law theory and jurisprudence by
synthesizing the scholarly literature on "functional parenthood"
and literally bringing it to court. The central issue addressed is
how the law should recognize the parental rights of an individual

who functions as a parent despite having neither biological nor
adoptive ties to the 'Child. Legal recognition of functional
parenthood, the Brief argues, is intended both to counteract the

For perspectives on the role of effective amicus bricfs generally see
Bruce J.Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1984); Ed R.
Haden & Kelly Fitzgerald Pate, The Role ofAmicus Briefs, ALA. LAW., March
2009, at 114; Kelly J.Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on
Effective Anicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33 (2004); Reagan Wm.
Simpson, How to Be a Good Friendto the Court: Strategic Use of Anicus Briefs,
28 THE BRIEF 3, at 38 (1999); Sylvia H. Walbolt & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Anicus
Briefs Revisited, 33 STETSON L. REV. 171 (2003). But see Julie Gannon Shoop,
Too Many 'Friends':Appeals Judge Uges Limits on Amuicus Briefs, TRIAL, Dec.
1997, at 18.
In assessing whether amicus briefs "'count" as scholarship, Professor
Chemerinsky has mused: "I think that perhaps it is best to avoid focusing on
form and instead look at quality ...Scholarship is, in a sense, an act of faith that
writing can make adifference." Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L.
REV.88 I, 892-93 (2009). For other amicus briefs reproduced in academic
journals, see, e.g., Symposium, Who Gets the Children? ParentalRights after
Troxel v. Granville, 32 RUTGERS L. J. 693 app. at 873 (2001) (reproducing
Center for Children's Policy Practice & Research at the University of
Pennsylvania amicus brief in Troxel v. Granville); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sarah
Hingcr & Kercn Zwick, Equality Opportunity: MarriageLitigation and Iowa '
Equal Protection, 12 J.GENDER RACE & JUST. 107 (2008); Suzanne B. Goldberg,
A HistoricalGuide to the Future of Marriagefor Samne-Sex Couples, 15 COLUM.
J.GENDER & L. 249 (2006) (reproducing brief of professors of history and family
law as alnicicuriae).
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harm inflicted upon children by separating them from a loving
parent 2 and to vindicate the rights of functional parents.
The Brief was submitted in the 2010 New York Court of
Appeals case, Debra H. v. Janice R., 3 in support of petitioner
Debra H. The petitioner had brought the suit two years earlier in
an effort to retain contact with the child she had been raising
with her former partner since the child's birth. At that time,
functional parents like Debra did not have standing in New York
to petition for visitation or custody as a result of the 1991 state
high court ruling in Alison D. v. Virginia M.,4 in which the court
declared adults in Debra's position to be "legal stranger[s]" to
their children. 5
Strikingly, forty-five family law professors from law
schools across New York State came together to sign the Brief.
By collectively endorsing one set of principles for judicial

2 See Bricf of Proposed Amici Curiae National Association of Social
Workers, ct al., in Support of Petitioner Debra H.'s Motion for Permission to
Appeal, No. 106569/08, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 980 (2011) [hereinafter NASW Brief] (citing Frank J.
Dyer, Termination of ParentalRights in Light ofAttachmnent Theory: The Case of
Kaylee, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 5, 11 (2004)); see also ShondelJ.v. Mark
D., 7 N.Y.3d 320, 330 (2006) ("The potential damage to a child's psyche caused
e
by suddenly ending established parental support need only b stated to be
appreciated."). The children of samc-scx couples equally feel the traumatic
cffects of separation. See NASW Brief, supra (noting that parcnt-child
relationships and the detrimental effects of the loss of such a relationship are the
same for children of samc-scx or different-sex parents).

3Debra H. v. JaniceR., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied, U.S.
131 S.Ct. 908 (Jan. 10, 2011).
4 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).
5While second-parent adoption has been available in New York since
1995, see In re Matter ofJacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651 (1995), not all couples complete
these adoptions when raising children together. Among the reasons a couple
might not proceed with a second-parcnt adoption arc one or both partners'
reliance on the stability of the relationship and financial obstacles, because
retention of a lawyer, the required home study, and the legal proceeding can be
costly. See Brief infra n.44; Brief for Citizcns' Comm. for Children, Lawyers for
Children and Children's Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Debra H. v.
JaniceR., 930 N.E.2d 184 (2010) at 28-30.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

recognition of functional parents, 6 they made a strong statement
to the court regarding the importance of functional parent-child
relationships and the viability of according those relationships
legal recognition.
The amici presented this analysis in part to neutralize the
biological parent's attempt to exploit the complex and
sophisticated state of family law literature. That parent, Janice
R., had urged the court not to wade into the intricacies of
adopting a functional approach to defining legal parenthood, 7 but
rather to leave any change in the law to the legislature. Janice R.
criticized what she perceived to be "Debra H.'s inability to
consistently propound one standard" for granting standing to
functional parents. 8 She emphasized the divergent approaches of
legislatures on a range of factors, including the amount of time
required before one can qualify as a functional parent, statutes of
limitations for bringing a petition, and distinctions between
petitions for visitation and custody. 9 She argued the issue of
functional parenthood was so complex-as evidenced by the fact
that "the standards defining who can assert such standing varies
widely from state to state" 10-that any changes to New York's
standard needed to be addressed by the state legislature. The
family law academics countered those arguments by reinforcing
that points of agreement exist in the literature and the case law
upon which courts can and should rely in making functional
parenthood determinations.
The Key Features of Functional Parenthood
To demonstrate the consensus around functional
parenthood, the Brief draws on the academic literature, the

Some of the amici who endorsed the brief tcach family law; others direct
child advocacy clinics or programs in family law.
I See Respondent's Opp. to Mot. for Leave to Appeal, Debra H v. Janice

R., No. 106569/08 (N.Y. July 21, 2009).
8Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 56-58.
0

1 Id. at 57.
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American Law Institute's Principles of Family Dissolution,"
and practices and jurisprudence in other states. It presents ways
that courts can-and already have-looked to function rather
than form when defining legal parenthood at the point of family
dissolution. More specifically, the Brief focuses the court's
attention on three factors consistently endorsed in the academic
literature: 1) legal parent's consent; 2) functional parent's intent;
and, 3) formation of a parent-child bond.
With respect to consent, the Brief argues that it is essential
that the legal parent have fostered a functional parent-child
relationship. Evidence of the legal parent's having fostered the
other adult's parental relationship with the child in effect
confirms the legal parent's consent that to the other adult also
becoming the child's parent. 12 In addition, the requirement
protects the legal parent's interests by ruling out claims from
people who have not actually functioned as parents. Consent can
be manifested in a number of ways; as the Brief shows, a legal
parent can: incorporate the functional parent's family name into
the child's name; encourage joint decision-making with respect
I The Principles have culled the work of academics into coherent
standards, identifying important features of functional parenthood that can help
to guide jurisprudence in the area of family dissolution. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M.,
711 N.E.2d 886, 891(Mass. 1999) (citing Principles when describing qualities of
a de facto parent); In re Parentage ofL.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 n.24 (Wash. 2005)
(noting that Principles "support[] the modem common law trend of recognizing
the status of defacto parents); Rubano v.DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974-75 (R.I.
2000) (noting, in decision giving recognition to a functional parent, that such
position is "in harmony with" the Principles). The Principles, however, have not
been without detractors. See, e.g., Penelope Eileen Bryan, Vacant Promises?: The
ALl Principles ofthe Law of Fainily Dissolution and the Post-Divorce
Circumstancesof Women, 8 DUKE J.OF GENDER L. & POL'Y 167, 167-68 (200 1)
(asserting that the Principles "do little to alleviate the post-divorce financial
distress experienced by women and their dependent children"); Gregory A.
Lokcn, The New "Extended Family "- "De Facto Parenthood and Standing
Under Chapter 2, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1073 (2001) (arguing that the
Principles,while well-intentioned, present a "substantial conundrum" in
allowing potentially abusive litigation by "[i]ndividuals whose only connection
to the child is rooted in a now failed love for the child's parent").

12See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L. J.459, 471 (1990) (noting that parental
status should flow from proof that a parent-child relationship was developed with
the cooperation and consent of the legal parent).
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to the child's healthcare, education and other needs; and support
the development of relationships between the functional parent's
immediate family or other relatives and the child. 13
In addition to requiring the legal parent's consent, the amici
maintain that the functional parent must have intended to
become a parent to the child, either from conception or by
becoming part of an existing family unit. A functional parent can
demonstrate this intent by assuming parental responsibility for
the child. This qualitative analysis would consider, for example,
the functional parent's sharing in the daily emotional and
financial care of the child, participation in religious activities
with the child and taking a parent-like role ing in family
outings.14

The development of a parent-child bond may also provide a
supplemental indication that a functional parent-child
relationship has developed and should be recognized by law.
Indeed, a number of courts have noted this feature in discussing
functional parenthood.15 It may be difficult, however, to prove
the existence of a parent-child bond when a child is very young.
3 See id. at 499 (offering cxamplcs of the devclopment of a parent-child
relationship that should allow the functional parent to seek parental status,
including: treating a child as part of both mothers' extended families; giving a
child the last name of both mothers; and agreeing (orally or in writing) to jointly
raise the child); see also Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is a Parent?: The Need to
Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513, 551
(1993) (discussing indicia ofconscnt, including: oral or written agreements; the
family name of both women included in the child's name; the assumption ofjoint
decision-making; and the child's relationships with each woman's family
members). In addition, when one partner consents to the insemination of the
other, that consent has been treated as the basis for establishing the parentage of
that partner with the child born as a result of the insemination. See Nancy
Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws
for Children of Lesbian Couples inithe Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. OF C.R.
& C.L. 201, 233 (2010) (discussing statutes providing that a person's consent to
the artificial insemination of a partner establishes that person as a parent of the
child).

14See, e.g., Ettelbrick, supra note 12, at 552 (discussing criteria for
functional parenthood, including the functional parent's participation in the daily
emotional and financial care of the child).
'5 See, e.g., V.C v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 553 (N.J. 2000); fi re Custody of
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
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When all other features of parenthood are in place, the amici
argue that such a difficulty should not preclude a functional
parent from having standing to petition for custody of or
visitation with the child he or she intended to raise with the legal
parent's consent.
A Partial Victory
The decision in Debra H. v. Janice R. came down on May
4, 2010, two years after Debra initially sought the aid of the
courts to secure her rights as a parent. The New York Court of
Appeals held that Debra has standing as a legal parent to petition
for visitation and custody rights with respect to her child. The
majority did so, however, on the basis of the couple's Vermont
civil union, not on grounds supported by the ideas of functional
parenthood. 16
Consequently, although Debra won an important victory in
the context of her own relationship with the child she had been
raising, the decision leaves most functional parents without legal
recognition in New York. In fact, the court specifically affirmed
its holding in Alison D. that "parentage under New York law
derives from biology or adoption,"' 7 and expressed the view that
those factors provide a needed bright-line rule for establishing
parental rights. 18It declared its conviction that "the predictability
of parental identity fostered by Alison D. benefits children and
the adults in their lives,' 9 and that the type of rule urged by
Debra H. "threatens to trap single biological and adoptive

16Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010). More specifically,

the majority relied on principles of comity to grant parental rights to Debra,
based on Vermont civil union law. Under that law, parties to a civil union are
deemed to have the same rights with respect to a child bom to either party during
the civil union. Id. at 195. Because the child in this case was born after the
parties entered into a civil union in Vermont, the court, drawing on Vermont case
law interpreting its civil union statute, held that Debra has standing to seek
visitation and custody of the child. Id. at 196-97.
17

1d. at 191.

18 1d.
19 1d. at 192.
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parents and their children in a limbo of doubt. '20 Any change in
the meaning of the term "parent," it wrote,
should be made by
2
the legislature rather than by the courts. '
Still, despite the majority's failure to embrace the amici's
argument, one concurring judge offered clear support for the
functional parenthood doctrine, establishing a potential path for
future decision-making on this issue: She found Alison D. to be
both "outmoded and unworkable," as urged by the amici.2 2 Yet
while her opinion stahds as at least one appellate voice of
support in New York for the adoption of a functional approach to
parenthood, 23 the court's majority left parents in Debra's position
who do not have a civil union or marriage with their former
partner in the same situation as before the case was decided-as
"legal strangers" to the children they are raising.
The Road Ahead
Debra H. won a personal victory in May, 2010, in that she
won the right to ask a court for visitation with and custody of her
child. However, the law in New York remains substantially
unchanged: non-biological parents who have not adopted the
children they are raising with a partner, or who were not married
to or in a civil union with that partner prior to the child's birth,
do not have standing to seek visitation or custody.
Following the New York high court's ruling, Janice R.
appealed for review in the United States Supreme Court, but the
Court denied her petition. 24 This denial, as well as the recent

20

1d. at 193.

21 Id. at

194.

221d. at 201 (Ciparick, J., concurring).
23 In the court's original Alison D. decision, Judge Judith Kaye also
embraced a functional approach to defining parenthood as the lonc dissenter. See
Alison D. v. VrginiaM, 77 N.Y.2d 651, 657-662 (1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
24

Janice R. v. Debra H., 131 S.Ct. 908 (2011).
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denial of review in a similar case25 provide a strong indication
that the Court intends to leave determinations of functional
parenthood to the states. 26
With this ongoing state-based control over family
recognition, functional parents around the country may continue
to face challenges from their former partners like those Debra
faced. While some states, notably California, 27 have adopted the
principles of functional parenthood, others, such as New York,
Utah, Illinois and Tennessee, continue to leave functional parents
in limbo. 28 Academics can thus continue to play an important
role in providing information and analysis that may be critical
for securing functional parents' legal rights in New York and in
other jurisdictions as states assess, and re-assess, their approach
to functional parenthood.
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are forty-five professors who teach and write
about family law on the faculties of every law school in New
York State. Their names, titles and institutional affiliations are
listed individually in an Attachment to this brief.
Amici have extensive expertise related to trends in family
law in New York and throughout the country. Through their
academic research, clinical work and teaching, amici have
25 CharismaR. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), cert.
denied, 2010 WL 596568 (Feb. 22, 2010). Unlike Debra H., however, Charisma
R. did not address the manner in which an out-of-state civil union factors into
recognizing parental rights.

26Subject, of course, to the constitutional limitations the Court described
in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (pertaining to the fundamental rights
of biological parents).
27California originally established its functional parent doctrine in Elisa
B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.4th 108 (Cal. 2005). For further detail on other
states' approaches to functional parenthood, see Part IIof the Brief.
28For other decisions in which state courts have considered the issue and
denied same-sex partners standing to petition for custody or visitation of their
non-biological or non-adoptive children, see, e.g., Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808
(Utah 2007); In re Visitation with C.B.L. v. H.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (I1. App. Ct.
1999); Thompson v. Thompson, I I S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

particular insight into the harmful consequences to parents and
children caused by formalistic conceptions of family.
In addition, based on their expertise, amici are able to
address developments in both legal scholarship and the law more
generally regarding the increasingly widespread recognition and
adoption of a functional approach to families and parenting.
They do so to supplement rather than duplicate the arguments
presented by the parties.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Family law academics overwhelmingly endorse an
approach to family law that recognizes and protects functional
parent-child relationships. This approach, which accords
recognition to individuals who have functioned as parents with
the legal parent's consent, rejects the formalistic rule of Alison
D. v. Virginia M. 29 That rule, much-criticized by scholars for its
harm to both children and their functional parents, bars legal
recognition of a parent-child relationship absent a biological or
adoptive tie between the child and adult in question. 30
By
contrast, the functional approach discussed here and endorsed by
both scholars and numerous courts reflects the reality of family
life today, and in doing so promotes the best interests of children
in New York State.
In particular, family law scholars have identified the legal
parent's consent, the functional parent's intent and the formation
of a parent-child bond as defining features of functional
parenthood.
These features are similarly endorsed by the
American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (2002).
Courts around the country have likewise embraced these
criteria as they have abandoned the formalistic conception of the
family reflected in Alison D. Importantly, these courts have
exercised their well-established equitable powers to adopt these
criteria, recognizing functional parent-child relationships that
best serve the interests of children while simultaneously
29

30

77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).
d. at 656.
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protecting the interests of legal parents and fairly addressing the
interests of functional parents.
The time is ripe for this Court, too, to shift away from
Alison D. toward a jurisprudence that more closely corresponds
to the reality of family life. In light of its established equitable
powers and past exercise of those powers to recognize functional
parents in certain contexts, this Court is well within its authority
to grant standing to functional parents and to protect important
functional parent-child relationships that will further the child's
best interests.
ARGUMENT
This Court can bring New York's family law into step with
the general trend, identified and endorsed by family law
academics throughout the State and country, toward adopting a
functional approach to defining legal parenthood at the point of
family dissolution. This functional approach best serves the
interests of New York's children, consistent with New York's
family law jurisprudence and this Court's equitable authority. In
doing so, a functional approach corrects the widely condemned31
and harmful formalistic rule set out by Alison D. v. Virginia M.,
which held that a woman who had functioned in all respects as a
parent to her child was nonetheless a legal stranger to that child,
because she was not the biological or adoptive mother of the
child.32
V.

Family Law Academics Overwhelmingly Endorse a
Functional Approach to Recognizing the Legal Family.

Family law academics from every law school in New York
State endorse an approach that recognizes functional families
and the functional parent-child relationships within those
families. Families, as respected scholars have long argued, are
not only groups of people who meet a formal definition of
family as created by adoption or marriage, but also those groups

3177 N.Y.2d 651.
32 Id. at 657.
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that function as a family, presenting themselves and being
33
recognized by others as such.
Academic scholarship uses a variety of terms to describe
non-biological and non-legal parents (here amici use the term
"functional parent"), but at their core, all terms stem from the
same essential commitment-that adults who develop parentchild relationships with the children they are raising are parents
in every respect.
A.

Family Law Academics Reject the Formalistic Rule
of Alison D. as Inconsistent with Family Realities
and Embrace a Functional Family Approach to
Defining Legal Parenthood.

In formulating a functional approach to the legal family,
family law academics have resoundingly rejected the approach
of Alison D. v. Virginia M.,34 which held that a woman who did
not have biological or adoptive ties to her child could not be a
parent within the meaning of New York's Domestic Relations
Law § 70.35 As one analyst pointed out, the Court's decision in
Alison D. demonstrated "a glaring lack of concern for the

33See, e.g., Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who In and Who's
Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 269, 270 (1991) (describing a functional family as
one that will "share affection and resources, think of one another as family
members, and present themselves as such"); see also Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is
a Parent?: The Need to Develop a Lesbian ConsciousFamily Law, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 513, 516-17 (1993) (discussing how a lesbian couple, through
intent, planning, and sharing of responsibilities, functions as a family unit).
34

77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).

35Id. at 656-57.
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interests of children living in nontraditional
important
' 36
families.

Moreover, there is consensus among academics that
children benefit from continued contact with functional parents
and that the law must recognize the importance of these
relationships in adjudicating familial disputes. 37 This consensus
demonstrates that a rule granting exclusive parental authority
only to legal parents and not to other adults with parent-child
relationships is inadequate to address the needs of today's

36Recent Case: Family Law--Visitation Rights-New York Court of
Appeals Refuses to Adopt A FunctionalAnalysis in Defining Family
Relationships-Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d27 (1991), 105 HARV. L.
REV. 941, 945 (1992); see also Andrew Schepard, Revisiting "Alison D.": Child
Visitation Rightsfor Domestic Partners,6/27/2002 N.Y.L.J. 3, [col. I ] at 3
(discussing how Alison D. prevents courts from making an individualized
assessment and visitation plan based on a child's needs). For additional
discussion, see, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Family Law Cases as Law Reform
Litigation, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 307 (2008) (discussing impact of Alison
D. v. Virginia M.); Martin Guggenheim, Revisiting Third Party Visitation Under
the Common Law in New York: Some Uncommon Answers, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 153, 183 (2009) (observing that many commentators have
criticized Alison D. and instead endorsed Judge Kaye's dissenting opinion in that
case); Joseph G. Arsenault, "Family" But Not "Parent": The Same-Sex
CouplingJurisprudenceof the New York Court ofAppeals, 58 ALB. L. REV. 813
(1995) (criticizing the formalistic approach taken by the Court in Alison D.).
37See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Parenthoodby Pure hitention: Assisted
Reproduction and the FunctionalApproach to Parentage,53 HASTINGs L.J. 597,
640 (2002) ("For some time now, courts and commentators have developed the
concept of functional parenthood as a way to recognize the important
relationships children often forge with individuals who function as their parents
but who do not have that legal status."); see also Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That
Binds: The ConstitutionalRight of Children to Maintain Relationships with
Parent-Like Individuals,53 MD. L. REV. 358, 389-90 (1994) (discussing how an
expanded definition of "parent" allows courts to address the best interests of the
child).
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children and their parents. 38 A functional family approach, by
contrast, meets the needs of contemporary families by ensuring
that family realities are reflected in law, particularly given that

38See Madeline Marzano-Lesnevich & Galit Moskowitz, In the Interest Of
Children of Sanie-Sex Couples, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 255, 270 (2005)

(describing as problematic the limitation of legal parental status to only the
biological mother in a same-sex relationship where the partners collaboratively
decided to become parents); Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Parenting:
The Last Thirty Years, 66 MONT. L. REV. 5I, 53 (2005) (observing in context of
gay and lesbian family dissolution that, in absence of adoption or other legal
recognition, "countless children have been hanned by losing a relationship with
their legally unrecognized parent"). For additional recognition of the failings of
the current rule, see Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third
Parties, or Parents? The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for
Parental Equality, 40 FAM. L.Q. 23, 48 (2006) (recognizing harm that comes
from denying important relationships by treating functional parents as legal
strangers); Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 155 (observing that New York law
"denies adults who have served as important parent-like figures the chance to
demonstrate that allowing a parent to sever arbitrarily all ties between the child
and the former parent-like figure is harmful to the child"); Holmes, supra note 9,
at 361-62 (describing jurisprudence granting exclusive parental authority to the
legal parent as "particularly inadequate when the dispute is between an adult who
has both a legal and an actual relationship with the child and an adult who has
only an actual relationship with the child"); Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered
Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 Berkeley Women's L. 17, 22-23
(1999) (recognizing disadvantage that functional parents face in the inability to
engage in parenting responsibilities such as consenting to medical care or
representing a child's interests to government agencies).
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many children are no longer raised by two married parents. 39 A
functional family approach acknowledges these realities and
serves the best interests of children by granting parental rights to
functional parents. 40
B. Family Law Scholarship Recognizes the Legal
Parent's Consent, the Functional Parent's Intent,
and the Development of a Parent-Child Bond as
Defining Features of a Functional Family.
Family law scholarship recognizes that both the legal
parent's consent and the functional parent's intent to create or
raise a family are of particular importance in defining functional
families. The formation of actual bonds of attachment in a
parent-child relationship is also relevant in determining who is a
functional parent.
1. The Legal Parent's Consent Is Essential to
Ensuring that the Legal Parent Intended to
Foster the Functional Parent-Child
Relationship.

39 See Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 153 (observing that it is no longer
true that most children are raised by two married parents); see also Charles P.
Kindregan, Jr., Collaborative Reproduction and Rethinking Parentage, 21 J. Am.
Acad. Matrim. L. 43, 44 (2008) ("[Tjhe reality of contemporary society is that
family life today takes many different forms, and as part of that development,
ideas about the meaning of parentage are changing."). For additional discussion
of the changing realities of the American family, see Developments in the LawChanging Realities of Parenthood, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2052, 2052 (2003)
(recognizing the changing reality of the form of American families and that
advances in reproductive technology have "challenged law's assumptions about
how families come to be"); Marzano-Lesnevich & Moskowitz, supra note 10, at
268 (observing that it "is well known that many same-sex couples are raising
families together in the United States"); Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel
v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32 Rutgers L.J. 825, 829 (2001) (noting
how mainstream family law scholars, practitioners, and courts have recognized
that a rigid parent-nonparent analysis does not reflect reality); Julie Shapiro, A
Lesbian Centered Critique of "Genetic Parenthood," 9 J. Gender Race & Just.
591"(2006) (discussing changes in the nuclear family and the diminishing
importance of genetic links).
40 See Forman, supra note 10 at 49 (advocating continued recognition of
functional parents to protect the children of same-sex couples).
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The legal parent's consent to and encouragement of a
functional parent-child relationship is essential to the legal
recognition of that relationship. 4'
The.consent requirement
protects the interests of legal parents by ensuring that the legal
parent intended to foster the functional parent-child relationship.
In particular, the consent requirement serves to protect the legal
42
parent from claims by individuals not functioning as parents.
Legal parents can manifest their consent in various ways.
As scholars have recognized, consent may be shown, for
example, by a legal parent incorporating a family name of the
functional parent into the child's name; making an oral or
written agreement with the functional parent to jointly raise the
child; engaging in joint decision-making with the functional
parent regarding the child's health care, education, and other
basic needs; and supporting the development of relationships
between the child and the functional parent's parents, siblings,
and extended family members. 43
4' See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 471 (1990) (noting that parental
status should flow from proof that a parent-child relationship was developed with
the cooperation and consent of the legal parent); see also Ettelbrick, supra note
5, at 548-50 (discussing requirements for functional parenthood, including
agreement of both adults to be co-equal parents).
42See Holmes, supra note 9, at 394-95 (demonstrating how adequately
defining the criteria that grants parental status to a functional parent-such as
requiring that the functional parent was a participant in the decision to create a
family unit-addresses concerns about expanding the category of those who may
seek standing to assert parental rights); see also Polikoff, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers, supra note 13, at 464 (arguing that parental autonomy and a child's
best interests can be served by including in the definition of a parent those who
have "maintain[ed] a functional parental relationship with a child" when the
legal parent "created that relationship with the intent that the relationship be
parental in nature").
13See Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supra note 13, at 499
(offering the following as examples of the development of a parent-child
relationship that should allow the functional parent to seek parental status:
treating a child as part of both mothers' extended families; giving a child the last
name of both mothers; and agreeing (orally or in writing) to jointly raise the
child); see also Ettelbrick, supra note 5, at 551 (discussing indicia of consent,
including: oral or written agreements; the family name of both women included
in the child's name; the assumption ofjoint decision-making; and the child's
relationships with each woman's family members).
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2.

The Functional Parent's Intent to Create a
Family Is Also Significant in Defining
Functional Parenthood.

The functional parent's intent ensures that he or she also
planned to become a parent by participating in the decision to
create a family, either from conception or by forming a family
unit with another adult and child. 44
By assuming parental
responsibility for the child, a functional parent demonstrates that
he or she has voluntarily and intentionally taken on a parental
role. 45 The requirement that the assumption of parenting be
voluntary confirms that individuals who have been paid to care
for the child or otherwise have not acted as parents
do not have
46
standing to assert a claim as functional parents.
Echoing scholars' commitment to evaluating the functional
parent's intent to parent, the jurisprudence in this area shows that
acts demonstrative of intent to parent include, for example: the
functional parent's taking time off of work to care for the child,
providing financial support, making decisions about the child's
care, participating in religious activities with the child, and going
on family outings. 47 These and other similar actions ensure that
the functional parent provided care indicative of a parent-child
relationship.
44See Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to
Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N.ILL. U. L.REV. 433 (2005) (arguing that
intent should be used as a means of establishing legal parentage for a functional
parent); Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of "Genetic Parenthood, "supra
note I1,at 611 (2006) (identifying intent and function as alternative ways of
recognizing parenthood rather than genetics); see also Kindregan, supra note 11,
at 46 (noting that instead of through biology and genetics, parenthood should be
determined in part by factors such as the intent of parties who cooperate in using
reproductive technology to have a child).
45See, e.g., Ettelbrick, supra note 5,at 552 (discussing criteria for
functional parenthood, including the functional parent's participation in the daily
emotional and financial care of the child).
46See Holmes, supra note 9, at 393 (discussing operation of voluntary
assumption of responsibility as a requirement for an expanded definition of
parenthood).
47See, e.g., In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,421-22 (Wis.
1995); see also infra Part II.A.
I.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

3.

The Development of a Parent-Child
Relationship Is Also Relevant to the Functional
Parent Determination.

The formation of a parent-child relationship is likewise an
important feature in evaluating whether an adult has become a
functional parent.4 8 In addition to being recognized by scholars,
a parent-child bond has been deemed relevant by a number of
courts. 49 However, when the dissolution of a relationship occurs
shortly after the birth or legal parent's adoption of a child, the
difficulty of proving a parent-child bond should not preclude a
functional parent from asserting a visitation or custody right so
long as that individual, with the consent of the legal parent,
planned for the child's conception or adoption into the family.
C. The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution Confirm that Consent, Intent,
and Development of a Parent-Child Bond Are
Central to Defining Functional Parents.
The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution (the "Principles"), produced by the nation's
leading organization devoted to improving the law through
collective contributions of scholars, also reflect and reinforce the
value of recognizing functional parents and the criteria by which

4 See, e.g., Minow, supra note 5, at 270 (observing that a family can bc
defined in part by the sharing of affection and resources).
11 See hifra Part ILA; see also VC. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 553; H.S.H.-K.,

533 N.W.2d at 42 1.
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50
In so
functional parent claims can be evaluated by courts.
around
consensus
widespread
the
confirm
Principles
doing, the
the defining features of a functional parent.

The Principles,like the academic scholarship on functional
parents, recognize and address the harm that arises when courts
do not appropriately respond to family realities. Specifically,
they reinforce that a functional parent's "participation in the
child's life is critically important to the child's welfare," and that
the law should therefore authorize and protect a child's contact
with that functional parent. 5'
In addressing the harm to children caused by a formalistic
approach, the Principles set out two categories of functional
parents entitled to legal recognition-de facto parents and

50 See American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter
Principles]. For additional scholarly discussion of the Principles,see J. Herbie
DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Theory of the Family: The American Law Institute s
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 923, 938
(2001) (describing aim of the Principles to resolve the tension between the
allocation of full recognition to legal parents and thc harm that results from
disallowing the maintenance of bonds between children and functional parents);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Horton Looks at the ALI Principles,4 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 151, 165 (2002) (affirming that the Principles allow for a more flexible
By formulating a framework for
and functional definition of family).
recognizing functional families in the law, the Principles aim to ensure that the
law remains responsive to the changing realities of family evident in both society
and legal institutions. See Developments in the Law, supra note II, at 2064
(discussing aims of the Principles); Goldberg, supra note 8, at 338 (noting that
the Principlesprovide "important authority").

51Principles,supra note 22, at ch. 1,1(d) (2002).
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parents by estoppel 52-- based on the same features identified in
the academic literature discussed above. 53 That is, the Principles

52The defining features of the two functional parent categories are largely
similar:
(b) A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a
legal parent, (i) is obligated to pay child support under
Chapter 3; or (ii) lived with the child for at least two years
and (A) over that period had a reasonable, good-faith
belief that he was the child's biological father, based on
marriage to the mother or on the actions or representations
of the mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities
consistent with that belief, and (B) if some time thereafter
that belief no longer existed, continued to make
reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as
the child's father; or (iii) lived with the child since the
child's birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent
responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting
agreement with the child's legal parent (or, if there are two
legal parents, both parents) to raise a child together each
with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the
court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is
in the child's best interests; or (iv) lived with the child for
at least two years, holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an
agreement with the child's parent (or, if there are two legal
parents, both parents), when the court finds that
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child's
best interests.
(c) A defacto parent is an individual other than a legal
parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a significant period
of time not less than two years, (i) lived with the child and,
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial
compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent to
form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a
complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform
caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed a majority
of the caretaking functions for the child, or (B) regularly
performed a share ofcaretaking functions at least as great
as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.
Principles,supra note 22, at § 2.03(l).
53

Id. at § 2.03.
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look to the legal parent's consent, the functional parent's intent,
and the formation of a parent-child relationship. 54
With respect to the legal parent's consent, the Principles
track the scholarly recommendations. For example, the legal
parent must enter an agreement, oral or written, with the
functional parent regarding acceptance of parental
responsibilities for that functional parent to be granted status as a
parent by estoppel. 55 Similarly, the legal parent must agree to an
arrangement whereby a functional parent takes on 5a6parenting
role for that person to be considered a de facto parent.
The Principles' requirement of parental intent on the part
of the functional parent likewise reflects the views of family law
academics. Parents by estoppel must have held themselves out
as parents and accepted full parental responsibilities, such as
making decisions about and attending to the child's well-being. 57
De facto parents must have performed a majority of, or at least a
large a share of, caretaking functions for the child, for reasons
other than financial compensation. 58
Caretaking functions
include, for example:
attending to a child's physical and
developmental needs such as nutrition and education, helping the
child develop interpersonal
relationships, and providing moral
59
and ethical guidance.
Also consistent with scholarly recommendations, the
Principles recognize the importance of a parent-child bond.

54See June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood." Uncertainty at
the Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1330 (2005) (observing that

the Principles'categories require agreement of the legal parent, a conclusion that
the functional parent has assumed parental obligations, and recognition that
according legal parenthood to the functional parent is in the child's best
interests).
55

Principles,supra note 22, at § 2.03(l)(b), § 2.03 Comment (b)(iii).

56

1d. at § 2.03(I)(c), § 2.03 Comment (c).

57Id.at § 2.03(i)(b), Comment (b)(iii), illus.9.
5

8Id. at § 2.03(I)(c).

59Id. at § 2.03(5).
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While they do not require a separate evaluation of that bond,
they explicitly recognize that disregarding the connection a child
-has with a functional parent at the time of family dissolution
"ignores child-parent relationships that may be fundamental to
the child's sense of stability."60
Affirming the Principles' utility, states have looked to the.
Principles in applying a functional approach to the assessment of
parent-child relationships. In E.N.O. v. L.M.M, for example, the
court relied on the Principles in defining a de facto parent and
observed that "[t]he recognition of de facto parents is in accord
with notions of the modem family.'6'
The Principles thus
reinforce, along with the academic literature, the widespread
view of experts that family law can and should recognize
functional parent-child relationships by giving consideration to
the legal parent's consent, the functional parent's intent and the
functional parent-child bond.
VI.

Adoption of a Functional Approach to Recognizing
Parent-Child Relationships in Jurisdictions Across the
Country, Including New York, Confirms the
Approach's Viability and Simplicity.

In jurisdictions across the country, including New York,
courts have exercised their equitable powers to grant standing to
functional parents who seek to maintain parent-child
relationships with the children they have been raising. Notably,
all of these courts have applied the same defining features, as
discussed above, in determining who can assert parental rights
and responsibilities at the point of family dissolution. They
examine whether with the consent of the legal parent, the
functional parent intended to and in fact assumed parental

60I. at ch. I, I(d).
61 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999); see also In re Parentageof L.B., 122
P.3d 161, 176 n.24 (Wash. 2005) ("[Tjhe American Law Institute's recent
recommendation supports the modem common law trend of recognizing the
status of defacto parents."); Rubano v.DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974-75 (R.I.
2000) (observing that the decision to recognize a functional parent-child
relationship was "in harmony with the principles recently adopted by the
American Law Institute").
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responsibility,andformed a parentalbond with the child. New
York can and should do the same.
A. Numerous Other States Demonstrate the Practical
Means by Which This Court Can Apply a
Functional Approach.
Over the past two decades, courts across the country have
rejected the formalism that characterizes Alison D. v. Virginia
M,62 and instead have embraced a functional approach to
63
recognizing parent-child relationships that amici advocate here.
1. The Basic Features of Consent, Intent, and
Parent-Child Bond Have Been Applied Most
Simply and Concisely by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.
The four-prong test proposed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.64 is the leading example of a
simple and concise application of the basic features of a
functional approach to recognizing parent-child relationships.
Other courts agree that the H.S.H.-K. test identifies those
relationships where an adult actually functions as a parent,
62

77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).

63See Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentageof ChildrenBorn to SameSex Couples: Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 683, 685 (2005) ("[A]
growing number of states have applied longstanding common law doctrines and
equitable principles to hold that a person who has functioned as a child's parent
may be entitled to seek custody or visitation with the child.., and may be
responsible for child support, even where they have not completed an adoption
or are not otherwise the child's legal parent."). For additional discussion, see,
e.g., Jacobs, supra note 16, at 436 (characterizing as "positive progress" courts'
increasing use of "functional parenthood principles and equitable doctrines" to
determine parental rights and responsibilities); Developments in the Law, supra
note II, at 2054 (finding that "parental rights doctrine has moved dramatically"
toward recognizing as parents those who would not have been accorded parental
rights under traditional law when they function as parents); Kathy T. Graham,
Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents,and Their Children s Rights as
Children, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1021 (2008) (observing that courts are
more willing than before to consider the rights of a lesbian partner after the
termination of a relationship).
64533 N.W.2d 419, 420-21 (Wis. 1995).
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precludes standing to persons not functioning as parents, and
serves the bests interests of the child.
The H.S.H.-K. court required consent from the legal parent
in prong one:
"[T]he biological or adoptive parent [must]
consent[] to, and foster[], the petitioner's formation and
establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child.165 The
court identified in the family at issue in H.S.H.-K. many of the
same manifestations of the legal parent's consent identified by
scholars above, including "the parties' agreement about the
conception of the child, the dedication ceremony naming both
parties as the child's parents, and the child's name," which was
hyphenated to include the names of both mothers. 66 As the court
recognized, the consent requirement protects the legal parent
67
against claims by individuals not functioning as parents.
Prong two, in requiring "that the petitioner and the child
lived together in the same household," provides a helpful
indicator of the adults' commitment to raising the child

65 1d. at 420; see also VC., 748 A.2d at 552. ("Prong one [of the
H.S.H.-K.
test] is critical because it makes the biological or adoptive parent a participant in
the creation of the psychological parent's relationship with the child.").
66

H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d

at 436 n.40; see also supra Part l.B..

67See id. at 436 (noting court's interest in protecting "parental autonomy
and constitutional rights by requiring that the parent-like relationship develop
only with the consent and assistance of the biological or adoptive parent"); see
also Rubano, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000) (affirming H.S.H.-K. test's ability to
"preclude such potential third-party parents as mere neighbors, caretakers, baby
sitters, nannies, au pairs, nonparcntal relatives, and family friends" from
obtaining standing); Il re Parentageof L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 179 (Wash. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (applying consent requirement to allay
concern that "teachers, nannies, parents of best friends ... adult siblings,
aunts ... grandparents, and every third-party. . . caregiver" could obtain

standing as functional parents).
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together. 68 In the third prong, the court required a showing of
the functional parent's intent to assume parental responsibilities:
"[T]he petitioner [must] assume[] obligations of parenthood by
taking significant responsibility for the child's care, education
and development, including contributing towards the child's
69
support, without expectation of financial compensation."
These requirements ensure that the functional parent functions
like a parent in the most literal sense.
The court's fourth prong requires formation of a parentchild bond: "[T]he petitioner [must have] been in a parental role
for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a
The
bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.' ' 0
presence of a parent-child bond helps to confirm that harm to the

68H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421. Because the legal parent's consent to the
development of the functional parent-child relationship is critical, H.S.H.-K.'s
second prong does not "allow a person to seek custody and visitation of a
boyfriend or girlfriend's child one day after they moved into the family home,'.'
as Respondent claims. Respondent's Opp. to Mot. for Leave to Appeal, Debra H.
v. JaniceR., No. 106569/08 (N.Y. July 21, 2009) at 3. Instead, as other courts
have recognized: "What is crucial here is not the amount of time but the nature
of the relationship." VC., 748 A.2d at 553. A day in thehousehold will not give
the hypothetical boyfriend or girlfriend standing; rather, the party seeking
standing for purposes of visitation or custody must have received consent to act
as a parent, assumed parental responsibilities, and formed a parent-like bond
with the child. Similarly, sharing physical space does not qualify one for
standing if the other criteria have not been met.
69

H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421.
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child would result if separated from the functional parent. 71 72
Nevertheless, courts have been attentive to scholars' concerns
that legitimate functional parents may face an unfair evidentiary
burden in proving a parent-child bond if the child is very
young. 73 Thus, courts have observed that the nature of the
parent-child bond assessment will vary based
on the "period and
74
stage of the child's life and development.
2.

Courts in Several Jurisdictions, Exercising WellEstablished Equitable Powers, Have Adopted
the H.S.H.-K. Functional Parent Test.

Courts in several jurisdictions have adopted the H.S.H.-K.
test to grant standing to functional parents. These courts have
praised the test as "[t]he most thoughtful and inclusive definition
of de facto parenthood."7 5 While H.S.H.-K. dealt specifically
with visitation, courts have applied its articulation of the key
features of functional parenthood to the full panoply of parental
71See Forman, supra note

10, at 48 (recognizing harm that comes from

denying important relationships by treating functional parents as legal strangers);
Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Parenting,supra note 10, at 53 (lamenting that

"countless children have been harmed by losing a relationship with their legally
unrecognized parent"); Brief for Citizens' Comm. for Children, Lawyers for
Children and Children's Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Debra H. v.
Janice R, 930 N.E.2d 184 (2010) at 4 ("The social science literature is replete
with studies tinding that children form attached relationships with non-biological
non-adoptive parents and that severing such relationships is traumatic and can
have long-term negative consequences for a child's development.").

72 The availability of second-parent adoption does not diminish the
inevitable harm caused by separating a child from his or her functional parent
when no adoption has taken place. See Brief for Citizens' Comm. for Children,
Lawyers for Children and Children's Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant,
Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (2010) at 28-30.

73See Part L.B.3 supra.
74VC., 748 A.2d at 553.
75VC., 748 A.2d at 551; see also hireParentage ofL.B., 122 P.3d 16 1,
176 (Wash. 2005) (affirming that "[r]eason and common sense support
recognizing the existence of defacto parents" using H.S.H.-K. test); Rubano, 759
A.2d at 974 (R.I. 2000) (citing elements of H.S.H.-K. test, as articulated in VC.,
as "useful criteria"); Middleton viJohnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 168 (S.C. Ct. App.
2006) (adopting H.S.H.-K. as a "good framework" for assessing functional
parenthood).
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rights. 76 Courts adopting the H.S.H.-K. test have done so in the
exercise of their equitable powers. Indeed, in H.S.H.-K itself,
the Wisconsin court invoked its "long standing equitable power
to protect the best interest of a child," while recognizing that the
state's custody statute did not apply to the functional parent in
that case. 77 Other states have followed suit. 78 This Court can
benefit from the accumulated wisdom of these courts, which
have found the H.S.H.-K. test to be a practical formulation with
predictable results that protects legal parents, best serves the
interests of children, and fairly assesses the interests of
functional parents.
3.

Other States Have Similarly Recognized
Functional Parent-Child Relationships.

Although amici consider the H.S.H.-K. test the simplest
and clearest articulation of the defining features of functional
parenthood, other states' formulations similarly recognize
functional parent-child relationships. This holds true across
states that apply other functional parent doctrines such as in loco
parentis and "exceptional circumstances," as well as in states
that do not use a fixed term or test to assess functional
parenthood.
For example, in TB. v. L.R.M, 79 Pennsylvania's high court
defined the in loco parentis doctrine using the features amici
endorse throughout this brief. The court required consent from
the legal parent: "[T]he third party in this type of relationship...
can not place himself in loco parentis in defiance of the [legal]
76

See, e.g., VC., 748 A.2d at 553 (applying H.S.H.-K. to custody and
visitation proccedings); L.B., 122 P.3d at 173, 177 (using H.S.H.-K. to determine
who is in "legal parity with an otherwise legal parent" with respect to "parentage,
visitation, child custody, and support").
77H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421-23 & n.3, 425.

78See, e.g., hire ParentageofL.B., 122 P.3d at 166 ("Washington courts
have consistently invoked their equity powers and common law responsibility to
respond to the needs of children and families in the face of changing realities.
We have often done so in spite of legislative enactments that may have spoken to
the area of law, but did so incompletely.").
79

786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001).
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parents' wishes and the parent/child relationship." ' 80 The court
also ensured that the functional parent intend to parent and
assume parental responsibility by requiring "the assumption of a
parental status, and ... the discharge of parental duties."8' The
court required parent-child attachment, as well, in the form of
"psychological bonds" between the functional parent and child. 82
Notably, the Pennsylvania court affirmed that these defining
features of functional parenthood apply uniformly across
83
custody, visitation, and parental support determinations.
Jurisdictions applying an "exceptional circumstances"
doctrine have also employed the basic features of a functional
approach to guide their inquiry. For example, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals applied the H.S.H.-K. test to confirm the
petitioner in the case was a functional parent, eligible for
standing to seek visitation under the state's exceptional
circumstances test.8 4 The court found the functional parent-child
relationship so "compelling" as to require legal recognition of
the relationship, even though the biological parent was fit and
available. 85
Similarly, Maryland's high court weighed the same
defining features of functional parenthood in describing that
state's exceptional circumstances doctrine. The court considered
"a finding that one meets the requirements that would give that
person defacto parent status . . . a strong factor to be considered
in assessing whether exceptional circumstances exist. ' 86 Further
80

Id. at 917.

1

8 1d.
82 Id. (quoting

J.A.L. v. E.PH., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Pa. Super. Ct.

1996)).
83Id. at 917 ("The rights and liabilities arising out of an in locoparentis
relationship arc, as the words imply, exactly the same as between parent and
child.").
4

Middleton, 633 S.E.2d at 168.

8

5Id. at 172.

16 Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 93 (Md. 2008).
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clarifying Maryland's exceptional circumstances test in its
remand order to the state Circuit Court, the Maryland Court of
Appeals included "the psychological bond between a child and a
third party" among the factors to be considered. Id.87
North Carolina's appellate court also applied the same
basic features in Mason v. Dwinnell.88 Although it did not
articulate a specific test, the court accorded a functional parent
standing to seek custody, looking to (1) the couple's agreement
to share in "all major decisions regarding their child"; (2) the
functional parent's deliberate assumption of "emotional and
financial care and support, guidance and decision-making" to the
point of "equal participation"; and (3) the functional parent's
"psychological parenting relationship" with the child. 89
Thus while some states call mothers like Debra H. a de
facto or psychological parent, some find that she stands in loco
parentisor that exceptional circumstances warrant standing, and
some prefer not to rely on strict terms or tests. However, one
unifying fact about these states' approaches is clear: all grant

87 The court articulated these equitable powers despite the limited category
of persons allowed to petition for parental rights under Maryland's family law
code. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1984). Thus even under the most
narrow statutory provisions, courts have not relinquished their equitable powers
to grant standing to functional parents. This court likewise retains its equitable
authority no matter how narrowly DRL § 70 is construed. See infra Part ll.B.

88 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
89

Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d at 65, 67.
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standing. 9° Amidst minor variations in language, these states
confirm the decisive trend toward use of a functional approach
to recognizing parent-child relationships.
B.

This Court's Decisions, as well as Lower Courts'
Decisions, Demonstrate This Court's Authority to
Recognize Functional Parent-Child Relationships.

This Court has repeatedly affirmed its authority to
reexamine "rules long settled but not recently revisited . . . if

there is some evidence that the policy concerns underlying them
are outdated or if they have proved unworkable." 91 In particular,
this CoUrt has long observed that courts are justified in rejecting
an "archaic and obsolete doctrine which has lost its touch with

9

See, e.g., In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995)
(parent-like relationship); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (de
facto parent); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (same); VC.,
748 A.2d 539 (psychological parent); In re E.L.M.C, 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. App.
2004) (same); TB. i L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001) (in locoparentis);
Middleton ivJohnson, 633 S.E.2d 162 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (exceptional
circumstances); hn re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2005) (same); Mason v.
Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (discussed supra); C.E.W.. 1
D.E. W, 845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 2004) (emphasizing that functional parent
"must surely be limited to those adults who have fully and completely
undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role
in the child's lifc"); Rubano, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (mixing terminology ofde
facto parents and psychological parents while applying H.S.H.-K.).
Recently, Montana's high court confinned its state's commitment to a
functional approach. Kulstad v.Maniaci, 352 Mont. 513 (2009). Delaware also
has joined the ranks of states employing a functional approach in a decisive
reversal of the state Supreme Court, which had failed to utilize its equitable
powers to protect children's best interests vis-A-vis their functional parents. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201(c) (2009) (overruling Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d
I (Del. 2009), by recognizing de facto parenthood).
91People ivDanmiano, 87 N.Y.2d 477, 489 (1996) (Simons, J., concurring).
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reality" despite the doctrine of stare decisis. 92 Based on this
authority, this Court has replaced outdated, unworkable rules
For similar
with new rules in many different instances. 93
reasons, the interpretation of Alison D. adopted by some lower
courts as precluding their authority to exercise equitable powers
warrants reexamination. The consequence of this unduly narrow
interpretation-the barring of legal recognition of functional
with modem-day needs and with
parents-is "at variance
94
concepts of justice.

Numerous lower courts have expressed the same concern
about the unworkable rule that results from interpreting Alison
D. to preclude courts from exercising their equitable powers to

92
People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 487-88 (1976); see also People v.
Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129, 149 (2007) ("[A] holding that leads to an unworkable rule,
or that creates more questions than it resolves, may ultimately be better served by
a new rule."); People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 338 (1990) ("Although a court
should be slow to overrule its precedents, there is little reason to avoid doing so
when persuaded by the 'lessons of experience and the force of better
reasoning."') (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Simonson v. Cahn, 27 N.Y.2d 1, 3 (1970)
("The doctrine of staredecisis does not enjoin departure from precedent or
preclude the overruling of earlier decisions ... [if] the principles announced
prove unworkable or 'out of tune with the life about us, at variance with modemday needs and with concepts ofjustice."') (quoting Bing v. Tbunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656,
667 (1957)).

93See, e.g., People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 347 (overruling People v.
Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981), as unworkable because the Bartolomeo rule,
which concerned suspects' waiver of rights absent counsel, was an "unacceptable
obstruction to law enforcement"); Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 486-91 (overruling three
earlier cases as unsound deviations from established constitutional right to
counsel for criminal defendants); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484 (1963)
(departing from traditional choice of law rule, which had generated "unjust and
anomalous results").
94

Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d at 667; see also supra Part L.A
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recognize functional parent-child relationships. 95 Indeed, this
Court has already exercised its equitable powers to recognize
functional parents and promote the best interests of the child on
many different occasions. In the recent case of Shondel J. v.
Mark D., 9 6 for example, this Court, based on the principle of
equitable estoppel, held that a non-biologically related adult who
had functioned as a parent was indeed a parent of the child for
paternity and support purposes. 97 Lower courts in the State have
similarly exercised their equitable powers to recognize

95

See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 20A.D.3d 333, 333 (1st Dep't
2005) (Sweeny, J., concurring) ("I am compelled to voice my concern that in
recognizing the primacy of the rights of the biological parent, the Court of
Appeals has defined a rigid construct which concomitantly ignores the reality of
the relationships that nurture and develop a child."); Multari v. Sorrell, 287 A.D.
2d 764, 771 (3d Dep't 2001) (Peters, J., concurring) ("If in custody and visitation
disputes, common sense, reason and an overriding concern for the welfare of a
child are to prevail over narrow selfish proclamations of biological primacy, the
assertion of equitable estoppel by a nonbiological or nonadoptive parent must be
given credence by the courts."); Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 246 A.D.2d 282,
289 (2d Dep't 1998) ("[Wle are of the opinion that the best interests of the child
will not be served in this case if... Alison D. [is] blindly applied."); Beth R. v.
Donna M., 19 Misc.3d 724, 733-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) ("If the concern of both
the legislature and the Court of Appeals is what is in the child's best interest, a
formulaic approach to finding that a 'parent' can only mean a biologic or
adoptive parent may not always be appropriate.").
96 7 N.Y.3d

320 (2006).

"7See also Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543 (1976) (exercising commonlaw authority to permit functional parent to seek custody consistent with the
child's best interests); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 432 (1925) (recognizing
court's "jurisdiction to determine the custody of infants as it exists at law and in
equity irrespective of the statute"). Importantly, New York's common law did
not historically distinguish the concept of custody from visitation. Indeed,
"[o]ne of the core common law principles... was the symmetry with which the
law treated efforts to secure custody and efforts to secure visitation."
Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 169.
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functional parents in order to promote the best interests of the
child. 9 8
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge the Court to bring

New York law into step with, the beneficial trend, recognized by
scholars and courts throughout the country as well as in this
State, toward protecting both children and parents at the point of

family dissolution by recognizing
relationships.

functional parent-child

Dated: November 16, 2009

Respectfully submitted,
Suzanne B. Goldberg
Clinical Professor and Director
Sexuality & Gender Law Clinic
Columbia Law School
435 West 116th Street
New York, New York 10027
Tel: (212) 854-4291
Fax: (212) 854-7946
Attorney for Amici Curiae
Amici appreciate the assistance of Columbia Law School
ProfessorAriela Dubler and Columbia Law School Sexuality &
GenderLaw Clinic students HarrietAntczak, Mark Musico, and
Seung-JaeLee in the preparationof this brief

98 See, e.g., Charles v. Charles, 296 A.D.2d 547, 549 (2d Dep't 2002)
(observing that in "cases involving paternity, child custody, visitation and
support, the doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied [] where its se
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